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NEW YORK CITY'S POTHOLE LAW:
IN NEED OF REPAIR
I. Introduction
In 1979, New York City enacted Local Law Number 821 (Pothole
Law) in an attempt to reduce the number of tort claims brought
against the city for sidewalk and roadway defects. Although the stat-
ute was discussed in terms of creating a more effective program of
street and roadway repair, the primary purpose of the law was to ease
a significant financial burden 2 on the city budget.3  The statute is
intended to address these policy considerations by requiring notice of
defect before the city may be found liable. 4 In doing so, however, the
statute unnecessarily sacrifices established legal principles.
At common law, cities have a duty to keep their streets in a reasona-
bly safe condition.5  If a municipality 6 has actual or constructive
1. NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE ch. 16, tit. A, § 394a-1.0(d), as added by Local
L. No. 82 of the City of New York for 1979, effective June 4, 1980. For the full text of
the statute, see note 36 infra.
2. Office of the Comptroller of the City of New York, Analysis of New York City
Sidewalk and Roadway Claims 14 (May 5, 1977) [hereinafter cited as Sidewalk and
Roadway Analysis]. "Unless corrective measures are taken, we estimate that the City
will pay out at least $71.8 million in the next seven years as a result of these claims."
Id. at 7. Other reasons for enacting the pothole law are discussed at notes 38-41 infra
and accompanying text.
3. Sidewalk and Roadway Analysis, supra note 2, at 5. The Office of the Comp-
troller's analysis of sidewalk and roadway claims established that the city, in the
fiscal years 1969-70 through 1975-76, paid $61.2 million to sidewalk and roadway
claimants. Id. at 3. In 1969-70, the average payment per claim was $1,600 while in
1975-76 the amount increased to $3,000. Id. at 5. The analysis also projected that the
average payment per claim would increase $200 each year so that a total of $71.8
million would be paid out in the years 1976-77 through 1982-83. Id. at 8. At the
public hearings before the City Council Committee on Governmental Operations in
1979, Comptroller Harrison Goldin testified that the figures rose even higher than
originally projected for the years 1976-77 through 1978-79. He stated that the New
York City prior written notice bill would save the city "at least $10 million a year,"
which could be spent on reconstruction of the City's streets and sidewalks. Testimony
by Comptroller Harrison Goldin before the City Council Comm. on Governmental
Operations, City Hall, New York (August 6, 1979). Comptroller Goldin testified that
in 1976-77, $9,798,000 was paid to 3,187 claimants, in 1977-78, $9,053,000 was paid
to 3,600 claimants and in 1978-79, $10,959,000 was paid to 4,965 claimants. Id. at 7.
See note 51 infra.
4. Local L. No. 82, subdiv. 2. See note 36 infra.
5. 19 E. MCQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 54.03b, at 13-14 (3d ed. 1967)
[hereinafter cited as MCQuILLIN]; Jones v. City of Columbus, 134 F.2d 464, 465 (5th
Cir. 1943); Peters v. City and County of San Francisco, 41 Cal. 2d 419, 424, 260
P.2d 55, 59 (1953); Rox v. Village of Great Neck, 25 Misc. 2d 848, 849, 214 N.Y.S.2d
213, 215 (Dist. Ct. Nassau County 1959).
6. For the purposes of this Note, a municipality or municipal corporation is a
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notice 7 of a dangerous condition and fails to act within a reasonable
period of time to repair the defect, liability is imposed for any result-
ing injury.' Accordingly, prior written notice statutes interfere with
the traditional negligence doctrine of constructive notice. This Note
examines traditional common law negligence as it relates to municipal
liability. The procedural requirements and legislative history of the
Pothold Law are analyzed. In addition, the legal and policy consider-
ations surrounding its enactment are discussed. This Note recom-
mends an alternative solution to the statute which takes into account
both the procedural inequities of the law and the city's financial
problems. A balance must be struck between the rights of injured
parties and the need of the city to have a reasonable opportunity to
effect repairs.
II. Traditional Negligence Approach to Municipal Liability
A municipal corporation has a dual function9 at common law; it
operates as a political and governmental body'0 and it acts in a
political unit which has a corporate status, quasi-independent from the state, and a
governmental status which is an extension of the state. See 18 E. McQUILLIN, supra
note 5, §§ 53.23-53.59. Included in this definition are cities, towns and villages.
7. Constructive notice is said to exist when a municipality is aware of facts and
circumstances which, by the exercise of reasonable diligence, would lead to the
knowledge required. 19. E. MCQUILLIN, supra note 5, § 54.102, at 287; McDermot
v. New York, 287 F.2d 49, 50 (2d Cir. 1961). In West Virginia, however, there is a
contrary case. In Burcham v. City of Mullens, 139 W. Va. 399, -, 83 S.E.2d 505,
508 (1954), the plaintiff was injured due to a latent defect in public steps. The
defendant asserted that the plaintiff has assumed the risk because she had construc-
tive notice of the latent condition which arose from her knowledge of a related patent
defect. The court held, however, that constructive notice could not be imputed to
plaintiff in the manner defendant asserted. 139 W. Va. at -, 83 S.E.2d at 512.
8. 19 E. MCQUILLIN, supra note 5, § 54.102, at 287. Barrett v. City of Claremont,
41 Cal. 2d 70, 73, 256 P.2d 977, 982-83 (1953); Griffin v. City of Cincinnati, 162
Ohio St. 232, __, 123 N.E.2d 11, 16 (1954). Glen v. Oakdale Contracting Co., 257
N.Y. 497, 500, 178 N.E. 770, 771 (1931); Michaels v. City of New York, 231 A.D.
455, 457-58, 247 N.Y.S. 781, 783-85 (1st Dep't 1931). Local L. No. 82, § 2, infra note
36. See also Durst, Prior Written Notice for Municipal Liability, 13 TRIAL LAW. Q.
52, 52 (1980). Durst points out that under the prior written notice law fault is not the
predominant means of determining the rights and liabilities of the parties. Id.
9. For a general discussion of a municipal corporation's dual function, see W.
PRossR, LAW OF TORTS § 131, at 977-84 (4th ed. 1971). For a more specific discus-
sion, see 18 E. MCQUILLIN, supra note 5, §§ 53.23-53.59; 1 E. YOKLEY, MUNICIPAL
CoRPORtTIONS, §§ 54-56 (1958).
10. W. PRossFB, LAW OF TORTS § 131, at 979 (4th ed. 1971). Governmental
functions are those which can only be performed by the government and are govern-
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proprietary capacity." Although negligent governmental acts per-
formed by a municipality are insulated from liability, 2 if a munici-
pality's acts are considered proprietary, the municipality is liable for
its negligence in the same manner as a private corporation. 13 Most
courts treat a city's obligation to maintain its streets in a reasonably
safe condition for ordinary use' 4 as a proprietary function.15 As a
result, a city is liable for the negligent performance of this duty.'
mental in nature. An example of such a function is the government's duty to make
and enforce adequate laws and regulations. Id. See also Whittaker v. Village of
Franklinville, 265 N.Y. 11, 14, 191 N.E. 716, 717-18 (1934).
11. Proprietary functions are those performed by a private corporation and in-
clude such duties as supplying water, gas or electricity to the public. W. PROSSER,
LAW OF TORTS § 131, at 980-83 (4th ed. 1971). See, e.g., C.C. Anderson Stores Co. v.
Boise Water Corp., 84 Idaho 355, -, 372 P.2d 752, 754 (1962) (maintenance and
operation of a water system is a proprietary function for which the city is liable); In
re Rapid Transit R.R. Comm'rs, 197 N.Y. 81, 96, 90 N.E. 456, 460 (1909) (construc-
tion of subway is a proprietary function); Hanks v. City of Port Arthur, 8 S.W.2d
331, 332-33 (Tex. Ct. Civ. App. 1928) (maintenance of streets and sidewalks consid-
ered a proprietary function). But see City of Little Rock v. Holland, 184 Ark. 381, 42
S.W.2d 383, 384 (1931) (lighting of streets is a governmental, as opposed to proprie-
tary, function).
12. W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 131, at 979 (4th ed. 1971). See also Bailey v. City
of New York, 3 Hill 531, 539-44 (1842); 3 E. YOKLEY, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS §
446, at 47-48 (1958). '
13. W. PaOSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 131, at 49 (4th ed. 1971). See also Rotella v.
McGovern, 109 R.I. 529, 288 A.2d 258 (1972), which held a city liable for damages
because of its negligence in maintaining a sewer, a proprietary function. Id. at 533,
288 A.2d at 260.
14. 19 E. MCQUILLIN, supra note 5, § 54.13, at 38; Pearson v. Boise City, 80
Idaho 494, -, 333 P.2d 998, 999-1000 (1959); City of Beaumont v. Henderson, 349
S.W.2d 301, 303 (Tex. Ct. Civ. App. 1961). Cf. Clark v. City of Buffalo, 288 N.Y.
62, 65, 41 N.E.2d 459, 460 (1942) (public park).
Locality, climate and weather conditions should be considered in determining
what is a reasonable degree of care. Sand v. City of Little Falls, 237 Minn. 233, -,
55 N.W.2d 49, 52 (1952). Included in this duty of reasonable care is a duty of
reasonable inspection. Ness v. City of San Diego, 144 Cal. App. 2d.668, -, 301 P.2d
410, 412 (Dist. Ct. App. 1956); Sambs v. City of Brookfield, 66 Wis. 2d 296, 307, 224
N.W.2d 582, 588 (1975).
15. W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 131, at 982 (4th ed. 1971). See also Myers v. City
of Palmyra, 355 S.W.2d 17, 18-19 (Mo. 1962). Cf. Augustine v. Town of Brant, 249
N.Y. 198, 163 N.E. 732 (1928) (public park), contra, Citcher v. City of Farmersville,
137 Tex. 12, 151 S.W.2d 565 (1941); Niblock v. Salt Lake City, 100 Utah 573, 111
P.2d 800 (1941); Erickson v. Village of West Salem, 205 Wis. 107, 236 N.W.579
(1931).
16. 19 E. MCQUILLIN, supra note 5, § 54.03b, at 14-15. See also Flannagan v. Lee,
56 Tenn. App. 60, 409 S.W.2d 385 (Ct. App. 1966); Rotker v. City of New York, 124
N.Y.S.2d 231 (Mun. Ct. Bronx County 1953).
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If a municipality causes a defective condition in a street or a side-
walk, it is liable regardless of whether it received notice of the de-
fect. 1 7 If the defect arises from natural deterioration or has been
caused by a third party, a city will not be liable for resulting injuries
unless it had actual or constructive notice of the dangerous condi-
tion.' 8 Constructive notice is found where an element of conspicu-
ousness or notoriety should have alerted the city as to the existence of a
defect.' 9 Notice is implied if the defect has existed for a substantial
period of time, such that municipal authorities, in exercising reason-
able care and diligence, could have known of its existence and made
the repairs. 20 This determination depends on the character, notoriety
and location of the defect. 2' By way of contrast, injuries resulting
from latent defects which are not due to faulty municipal work, and
which could not have been discovered by ordinary care and diligence,
do not result in the city's liability unless the city has actual notice of
the defect.2 2 In cases of constructive notice, common law imposes
liability because a city has absolute control over its streets, including
the power to build, improve and maintain them.2 3  It is logical,
therefore, that a city be liable for its negligence in exercising these
17. 19 E. MCQUILLIN, supra note 5, § 54.104, at 291. See also Rupp v. New York
City Transit Auth., 15 A.D.2d 800, 801, 224 N.Y.S.2d 1007, 1009-10 (2d Dep't.
1962); Batten v. South Seattle Water Co., 65 Wash. 2d 547, 551, 398 P.2d 719, 722
(1965).
18. 19 E. MCQUILLAN, supra note 5, § 54.102, at 288-89; Smith v. District of
Columbia, 189 F.2d 671, 674 (D.C. Cir. 1951); Barrett v. City of Claremont, 41
Cal. 2d 70, 72, 256 P.2d 977, 979 (1953).
19. City of San Diego v. Perry, 124 F.2d 629, 630-31 (9th Cir. 1941), which held
that a break in the grade of the sidewalk which was a drop of three and one half
inches per two feet was conspicuous and the city was deemed to have constructive
notice. Id. at 630-31. See also Bottalico v. City of New York, 281 A.D. 339, 119
N.Y.S.2d 704 (1st Dep't 1953); Gibbons v. City of New York, 200 Misc. 699, 700, 110
N.Y.S.2d 731, 732 (Mun. Ct. Queens County 1951).
20. See notes 26-34 infra and accompanying text. Peterson v. Kansas City, 324
Mo. 454, -, 23 S.W.2d 1045, 1048 (1929); Dahl v. Nelson, 97 N.D. 400, __, 56
N.W.2d 757, 760 (1953).
A New York court held that a municipality can be charged with constructive notice
if the defect exists for four months. Napoli v. City of New York, 144 N.Y.S.2d 110,
114 (N.Y.C. Ct. N.Y. County 1955). A Georgia court imputed constructive notice to
a municipality when the defect exited for less than a month. City of Thomson v. Poss,
93 Ga. App. 663, -, 92 S.E.2d 557, 558 (1956). See generally 19 E. MCQUILLIN,
supra note 5, § 54.110, at 312-23.
21. Gilson v. City of Anderson, 141 Ind. App. 180, -, 226 N.E.2d 921 (1967).
22. 19 E. MCQUILLIN, supra note 5, § 54.111, at 326-27. See Barrett v. City of
Claremont, 41 Cal. 2d 70, 256 P.2d 977 (1953); Hart v. Butler, 393 S.W.2d 568 (Mo.
1965); Toreen v. City of Mount Vernon, 243 A.D. 612, 276 N.Y.S. 379 (2d Dep't
1935).
23. 19 E. MCQUILLIN, supra note 5, § 54.03c, at 18.
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powers.24 Placing the burden of inspection on the public is unfair
because the public has neither the resources nor the organization to
undertake such a task. 25
In addition to the general common law rule of imposing liability on
a city for negligently maintaining its public streets and sidewalks
when the city has adequate notice of defects, New York common law
requires claimants to prove that the defect which caused the injury
was not trivial in nature. 26  This rule, commonly known as the "triv-
ial defect rule," has a long tradition in New York and was refined and
clarified in Loughran v. City of New York.27  In Loughran, plaintiff
sued the city to recover for injuries sustained when he fell into a hole
in Washington Square Park. The city contended that it was not liable
because there was no evidence that the hole was more than four inches
deep and was not trivial in nature. 28 In rejecting the city's conten-
24. Id. § 54.05, at 16-18. See Millas v. Town of Wilson, 222 N.C. 340, -, 23
S.E.2d 42, 44 (1942).
25. In Hunter v. North Mason High School, 85 Wash.2d 810, 539, P.2d 845
(1975), a Washington State notice of claim statute which required that notice be
provided within 120 days of the injury was declared invalid. Id. at 818, 539 P.2d at
850. The Washington Supreme Court observed that governmental subdivisions "pos-
sess special investigative resources" which make them better equipped to investigate
and defend than most private tortfeasors. Id. at 816, 539 P.2d at 849. Although this
statement was made in reference to the notice of claim statute, it is analogous to a
notice of defect statute. The governmental entity is far better equipped to inspect
streets than the private individual. See also Durst, Prior Written Notice for Munici-
pal Liability, 13 TRIAL LAW. Q. 52, 63 (1980). Initially it was necessary to encourage
cities to pave streets and sidewalks without concern for civil liability, especially
because methods of paving were new and unreliable. It may have been desirable, at
the time, to allow cities to avoid their duties to maintain streets and sidewalks by
conditioning or limiting their liability for negligent maintenance of those structures.
Id. Because of the increased size and sophistication of cities as well as the changing
expectations of citizens, traditional negligence concepts ought to be implemented. Id.
26. Tripoli v. State of New York, 72 A.D.2d 823, 824 (3d Dep't 1979). Here,
plaintiff fractured his wrist when he fell into a hole in a state park parking lot. The
court held that claimant failed to show that the hole represented anything more than
a trivial defect or that it was so out of character with the surroundings as to be a
foreseeable cause of the accident. Because the state had no reasonable means of
discovering the defect it could not be charged with constructive notice. Id. See also
Fox v. Brown, 15 N.Y.2d 597, 598, 203 N.E.2d 650, 255 N.Y.S.2d 263 (1964); Scally
v. State of New York, 26 A.D.2d 606 (3d Dep't 1966).
The trivial defect rule originated as the "four inch rule." Cities in New York State
were not liable unless the plaintiff could prove that the defect was at least four inches
deep. Beltz v. City of Yonkers, 148 N.Y. 67, 70, 42 N.E. 401, 402 (1895). Although
the cases following this rule did not actually specify that the defect had to be greater
than four inches, the later cases created the name "four inch rule" because the earlier
cases which exempted cities from liability involved defects which were smaller than
four inches.
27. 298 N.Y. 320, 83 N.E.2d 136 (1948) (per curiam).
28. Id. at 321, 83 N.E.2d at 136-37.
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tion, the court held that a municipality's liability does not depend on
the depth of the defect, but rather on whether the city has maintained
the public thoroughfares in a reasonably safe condition. 29
Although the Loughran decision is interpreted as the abandonment
of a mathematical standard to determine liability, it is not an aban-
donment of the trivial defect rule itself.30  Cases decided subsequent
to Loughran continue to hold the municipality liable only when the
defect is not trivial. 31  For example, in Lipinsky v. City of New
York, 32 the plaintiff fell on a defect in the sidewalk consisting of a
separation of approximately one inch in the metal curbing. An action
was brought against the city for negligent maintenance of the side-
walk. 33 The court held that the defect was of such a minor character
that it "could not be" the cause of the plaintiff's fall. 34 Therefore,
New York common law requires a plaintiff to prove the following four
elements in order to prevail in a negligence action against the city:
first, that a defect in a sidewalk or street was more than trivial in
nature; second, that the city had actual or constructive notice of the
defect; third, that the city breached its duty to repair the defect; and
fourth, that the injury to plaintiff was proximately caused by the
defect. With the enactment of the Pothole Law, however, common
law principles have been modified significantly.
III. The Pothole Law
The New York City prior written notice statute eliminates the
doctrine of constructive notice and allows an injured plaintiff to
29. Id. at 322, 83 N.E.2d at 137.
30. Parker v. Port Auth., 22 Misc. 2d 421, 422, 197 N.Y.S.2d 975, 976-77 (N.Y.C.
Mun. Ct. Bronx County 1959). Plaintiff fell in a hole in the floor of the Port
Authority Bus Terminal. Substantial evidence concerning the size of the hole was
adduced. The court stated that "the Loughran case was merely the abandonment of a
mathematical measure of what is a trivial defect." Id. at 422, 197 N.Y.S.2d at
976-77. Instead the test was whether the street was reasonably safe under the "cir-
cumstances in each case." Id. at 422, 197 N.Y.S.2d at 977.
31. Tripoli v. State of New York, 72 A.D.2d 823, 824 (3d Dep't 1979); Mascaro v.
State of New York, 46 A.D.2d 941, 362 N.Y.S.2d 78 (3d Dep't 1974); Scally v. State
of New York, 26 A.D.2d 606, 606-07 (3d Dep't 1966); Lipinsky v. City of New York,
11 Misc. 2d 734, 735 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1957), aJJ'd, 8 A.D.2d 600 (2d Dep't
1959).
32. 11 Misc. 2d 734 (Sup. Ct. New York County 1957).
33. Id.
34. Id. at 735. In Mascaro v. New York, 46 A.D.2d 941 (3d Dep't 1974), plaintiff
tripped on a curb which was raised approximately two inches above the adjacent
sidewalk. In trying to steady herself, plaintiff fell on a small depression in the curb,
id., and brought an action against New York State for negligence. The appellate
division denied plaintiff recovery and held that the defect was trivial in nature and
possessed none of the characteristics of a trap or a snare. Id.
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recover only if the city has written notice .3  The statute provides in
pertinent part:
No civil action shall be maintained against the city for damage to
property or injury to person . . . sustained in consequence of any
street, highway, bridge . . . sidewalk or crosswalk . . .. being out
of repair, unsafe, dangerous or obstructed, unless . . . written
notice of the defective . . . condition . . . was actually given to the
commissioner of transportation ... and there was a failure or
neglect within fifteen days after the receipt of such notice to repair
or remove the defect . . . or the place otherwise made reasonably
safe. 36
35. Local L. No. 82, supra note 1.
36. Local L. No. 82. The statute provides in full:
d. 1. As used in this subdivision:
(a) The term "street" shall include the curbstone, an avenue, under-
pass, road, alley, lane, boulevard, concourse, parkway, road or path
within a park, park approach, driveway, thoroughfare, public way, pub-
lic square, public place, and public parking area.
(b) The term "sidewalk" shall include a boardwalk, underpass, pedes-
trian walk or path, step and stairway.
(c) The term "bridge" shall include a viaduct and an overpass.
2. No civil action shall be maintained against the city for damage to
property or injury to person or death sustained in consequence of any
street, highway, bridge, wharf, culvert, sidewalk or crosswalk, or any
part or portion of any of the foregoing including any encumbrances
thereon or attachments thereto, being out of repair, unsafe, dangerous or
obstructed, unless it appears that written notice of the defective, unsafe,
dangerous or obstructed condition, was actually given to the commissioner
of transportation or any person or department authorized by the commis-
sioner to receive such notice, or where there was previous injury to person
or property as a result of the existence of the defective, unsafe, dangerous
or obstructed condition, and written notice thereof was given to a city
agency, or there was written acknowledgement from the city of the defec-
tive, unsafe, dangerous or obstructed condition, and there was a failure or
neglect within fifteen days after the receipt of such notice to repair or
remove the defect, danger or obstruction complained of, or the place
otherwise made reasonably safe.
3. The commissioner of transportation shall keep an indexed record in a
separate book of all written notices which the city receives and acknowl-
edgement of which the city gives of the existence of such defective, unsafe,
dangerous or obstructed conditions, which record shall state the date of
receipt of each such notice, the nature and location of the condition stated
to exist and the name and address of the person from whom the notice is
received. This record shall be a public record. The record of each notice
shall be maintained in the department of transportation for a period of
three years after the date on which it is received and shall be preserved in
the municipal archives for a period of not less than ten years.
4. Written acknowledgement shall be given by the department of trans-
portation of all notices received by it.
1982]
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In addition, the statute does not require fifteen days notice prior to
injuries resulting from defects which remained unrepaired, though
the city received written notice after the same defect caused a separate
injury. 31
The city had four major reasons for enacting the statute: to modern-
ize the Administrative Code and bring it into conformity with almost
all other cities in New York State; 38 to reduce the amount of money
spent on sidewalk and sidewalk claims; 39 to eliminate the vast number
of false and highly exaggerated claims; 40 and to provide the impetus
for street and sidewalk repair.
41
The Office of the Comptroller of the City of New York initially
proposed the adoption of a prior notice statute after analyzing New
York City sidewalk and roadway claims in 1977.42 The purpose of
the analysis was to compute the losses the city had incurred from
sidewalk and roadway claims and project future costs. 43  The ulti-
37. Id. Also, the city will be liable if it acknowledges the defect in writing and
fails to repair the defect within 15 days. Id.
38. Letter from Allen G. Schwartz, Corporation Counsel, City of New York, to
Hon. Thomas J. Cuite, Vice-Chairman and Majority Leader, Council of the City of
New York 6 (July 27, 1979). With the enactment of the New York City prior notice
bill, 61 out of 62 cities in New York State have prior written notice statutes. Besides
Yonkers, New York City is the only city in New York State which does not have a
prior written notice law. For a list of the cities with prior notice laws, see Sidewalk
and Roadway Analysis, supra note 2, at 10 (Table 4). In addition, five incorporated
towns and fifty-eight incorporated villages of the State of New York have prior
written notice laws. Id. at 11 (Table 5). It is important to challenge the law in New
York City because the potential for widespread harm is much greater due to the city's
enormous size and population. The statutory authorization is discussed at notes 74-76
infra and accompanying text.
39. See note 3 supra.
40. Harrison Goldin, Comptroller of the City of N.Y., Hearings on Amendments
to ch. 16, tit. A, § 394a-1.0 of the Administrative Code of the City of N. Y. Before the
Comm. on Governmental Operations (Aug. 6, 1979) [hereinafter cited as Hearings
on Amendments]. See also N.Y. County Lawyers Ass'n Maj. Report on City Council
Bill Interim No. 687 1 (Oct. 29, 1979).
41. Hearings on Amendments, supra note 40, at 8. It is questionable whether the
city has actually increased its repair activities. Figures reported by Richard T.
Watson, Director of Management Services, show that since June 4, 1980, the effec-
tive date of the statute, through July 31, 1981, the Department of Transportation
received 74,982 defect notices. Of that amount, 73,546 passed the initial screening
which determines whether the information in the notice is sufficient for repairmen to
locate the potholes. The eligible notices were forwarded to the Borough Offices of the
Bureau of Highway Operations for resolution. As of August 17, 1981, 40,624 or 55 %
were repaired and 32,922 or 45% remained unrepaired. Letter to author from
Richard T. Watson, Director of Management Services (Aug. 17, 1981) (letter on file
at Fordham Urban Law Journal).
42. Sidewalk and Roadway Analysis, supra note 2.
43. Id. at 1. This was the third report in a series which focused on the payment
process of claims against the city. The first report, issued in 1975, focused on
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mate goal of the study was to recommend an efficient means to
reconstruct city streets before accidents occurred, rather than react to
defective conditions after damage claims had been filed. 44 In order to
achieve these goals, the Office of the Comptroller recommended that
the city enact a statute pursuant to the General Municipal Law4"
requiring that the city receive prior written notice before being held
liable for sidewalk and roadway defects. 46  It contended that the
enactment of such a statute, by substantially reducing the number of
awards paid out, would provide the city with time and money to
perform needed construction. 47  In addition, it was argued that the
city would be better able to determine the validity of alleged claims. 48
After referral to the Committee on Governmental Operations, 49
two public hearings were held. 50  The testimony in favor of the bill
stressed that the city would save an estimated $10 million per year 5 1
because the number of claims brought against other cities in New
York State with prior written notice statutes had been minimal.5 2
Special interest groups, such as the New York State Trial Lawyers
Association and the Automobile Club of New York which testified
against the bill, claimed that it was oppressive to the old, poor and
defective sidewalks. The second report, issued in 1976, focused on the city's driver
training program. Id.at 1-2.
44. Id. at 1.
45. Section 50-g of the General Municipal Law, N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 50-g
(McKinney 1977), enables the city to enact a prior written notice statute under
certain conditions. See note 75 in]ra.
46. Sidewalk and Roadway Analysis, supra note 2, at 9.
47. Id. See note 3 supra.
48. Sidewalk and Roadway Analysis, supra note 2, at 9.
49. Report of the Comm. on Governmental Operations, Interim No. 687-A Min-
utes, 1466 (May 22, 1979) [hereinafter cited as Committee Report].
50. The first hearing was held on August 13, 1979 and the second hearing was
held on August 22, 1979. Id.
51. Committee Report, supra note 49. See note 3 supra.
52. Id. The cities which the Comptroller's Office referred to were Rochester,
Buffalo, Syracuse and Albany. Research performed concerning other large New York
State cities revealed that there were substantial decreases in the dollar amounts of
claims paid out in those cities since the passage of prior written notice statutes. Letter
from Helen Becker, Legislative Analyst, to Stanley Schlein, Assistant Counsel to
Majority Leader of the City Council (Nov. 5, 1979).
Corporation Counsel in Rochester indicated that since the enactment of a prior
written notice statute, claims and payments were "getting close to zero." Letter from
Helen Becker to Stanley Schlein (Oct. 18, 1979). In Buffalo, only 200 to 300 claims
per year are filed and only 5 % of the claimants recover from the city. Letter from
Allen G. Schwartz to Hon. Thomas J. Cuite 5 (July 27, 1979). Syracuse received only
50 claims in 1978. In Albany, only one sidewalk case was litigated and the plaintiff
elected to discontinue it before the merits were heard. Id. at 6.
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infirm. 53 In November, 1979, the Committee on Governmental Op-
erations recommended the adoption of the legislation and the bill was
enacted. 54
The statute sets forth certain duties that the city must perform upon
receipt of notice of a defect, but does not articulate the type of
information which constitutes proper written notice. As a result, the
city developed the following procedure for reporting defects. 55
When an individual reports a pothole by sending a letter of notice, 56
the city acknowledges receipt by sending a form 57 that must be com-
pleted and returned to the Commissioner of Transportation. 58 If the
53. Committee Report, supra note 49. Other special interest groups included
negligence lawyers and Block Associations.
54. Committee Report, supra note 49. The pothole law passed in the City Council
by a 24 to 16 vote and became effective on June 4, 1980.
55. Although the statute does not describe the form which the notice must take, §
3 of the pothole law requires that the notices be kept by the Commissioner of
Transportation in an indexed record open to the public. Local L. No. 82, § 3. The
record must state the date of receipt of the notice, the nature and location of the
defective condition and the name and address of the person who submitted the
notice. Id. The notices must be held by the Department of Transportation for three
years after the date of receipt and then be preserved in the municipal archives for a
period of not less than three years. Id. The purpose of the section is to provide a
means by which an individual injured by a street defect may determine whether a
right exists to bring an action against the city. An individual is not permitted to
search for the notice, but must pay a fee to have the search performed by a city
official. Once the search is completed, the person is notified of the results. N.Y.L.J.,
Dec. 16, 1980, at 3, col. 1.
56. It is the city's view that the fifteen days it has to repair the defect starts to run
as of the receipt of the initial letter. Interview with Jeffrey Glen, Special Assistant,
Corporation Counsel, New York City (Aug. 11, 1981).
57. The form is entitled "Local Law 82. Notice of Street/Sidewalk Defect." The
form can be obtained at Transportation Department headquarters at 40 Worth
Street, Room 1634, New York, New York and the department's borough offices.
The form is printed in both English and Spanish and asks for the individual's
name, address, telephone number and the exact location of the pothole by address. If
no street number is available, the number of feet the pothole is from an intersection
or other fixed object is requested. Once the form is received by the Department of
Transportation, it is attached to the original letter of notice and kept in an indexed
record.
58. The Commissioner of Transportation is the head of the Department of Trans-
portation. 1 N.Y. CITY CHARTER § 2901 (Supp. 1980-81). He may appoint four
deputies, one of whom shall oversee highway operations. Id. § 2902. His powers
relevant to the pothole law include:
(1) preparing and transmitting budget estimates for the department. Id. §
2903 (a)(1).
(2) submitting to the mayor proposals for amendment of any resolutions,
rules or regulations of any city agency which affect traffic conditions in
the city, and proposing legislation necessary to implement such proposals.
Id. § 2903 (b)(8).
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person reporting the defect fails to return the form, a question will
arise as to whether the original letter constitutes proper notice.
In Matter of Big Apple Pothole and Sidewalk Protection Commit-
tee, Inc. ,59 the sufficiency of maps depicting the location of thousands
of potholes was questioned. The maps had been submitted to the city
by the Big Apple Pothole and Sidewalk Protection Committee (the Big
Apple Committee), a group formed by the New York State Trial
Lawyers Association. 60  The court held that the maps constituted
adequate notice to the city of the existence of potholes."' The maps
were found to be
[m]ore precise in terms of the type of defects and their location
than the forms previously used by the petitioner and accepted by
the respondent. Moreover, the maps [were] far more detailed than
respondent's own forms for such notification. 2
The court ordered the New York City Department of Transportation
to file the maps in the indexed record of notices.6 3 Despite the court's
holding, it will be difficult to ascertain whether in a particular case
sufficient notice has been provided because the statute does not clearly
establish what constitutes prior written notice. 64
The passage of the New York City prior written notice law has
provoked debate among city officials, special interest groups and
concerned citizens.6 5 This controversy centers around both legal and
(3) preparing and submitting to the mayor recommendations and pro-
posals for the improvement of existing streets, highways and parkways. Id.
§ 2903 (b)(9).
(4) repairing all public roads, streets, highways and parkways. Id. § 2903
(c)(3).
59. N.Y.L.J., July 24, 1981, at 6, col. 1.
60. The Big Apple Pothole and Sidewalk Protection Corporation is a nonprofit
corporation whose president, Sheldon Albert, is a negligence attorney. Because negli-
gence lawyers are more apt to be affected by the pothole law, the corporation was
established to prepare lists of street and sidewalk defects and file them with the city
in order to protect future injured claimants. See Lawyers Group Files Long Brief on
City Hazards, N.Y. Times, June 5, 1980, at B3, col. 8.
61. N.Y.L.J., July 24, 1981, at 6, col. 2.
62. Id. at cols. 1, 2.
63. Id.
64. For example, if a letter is sent stating that there are potholes on the Brooklyn
Bridge, the city would have a strong defense that proper notice was not given because
such a letter is too vague. This is because there could be one hundred potholes on the
Brooklyn Bridge. There will be many cases, however, where notice is neither as
specific as a map indicating exact locations of potholes, nor as vague as the Brooklyn
Bridge example. The notices which fall into this gray area will invite litigation. See,
e.g., N.Y. County Lawyers Ass'n, Maj. Report on City Council Bill Interim No. 687
3 (Oct. 29, 1979).
65. See note 53 supra and accompanying text.
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policy considerations. Groups opposing the Pothole Law present three
legal arguments: that the law is unconstitutional; 6 6 that it is a proce-
dural device to reinstate the doctrine of sovereign immunity; 67 and
that it derogates traditional common law negligence."
The New York State Constitution provides:
[E]very [city] shall have the power to adopt and amend local laws
not inconsistent with the . . .constitution or any general law [of
the state] . . .relating to . . . the acquisition, care, management
and use of its ... streets and property . . . .
In the New York Court of Claims Act, ° the state waives its sovereign
immunity and consents to have its liability "determined in accordance
with the same rules of law as are applied to actions in the [state]
supreme court against individuals or corporations . . . .,,71 It is ar-
gued that the Pothole Law is inconsistent with the Court of Claims
Act because it eliminates constructive notice.72 Such an inconsistency
is prohibited by the New York State Constitution and, therefore,
critics of the Pothole Law contend that it is unconstitutional.73 This
argument, however, fails to consider statutory authority which allows
political subdivisions to limit their liability in suits arising from street
and sidewalk defects of which they had no prior written notice.7 1
66. There are three arguments declaring the Pothole Law unconstitutional. First,
that it is inconsistent with the Court of Claims Act. Second, that it violates the equal
protection clause of the United States and New York State constitutions. Third, that
it violates standards of due process. See notes 69-137 infra and accompanying text.
67. See notes 138-143 infra and accompanying text. Sheridan Albert, President,
New York State Trial Lawyers Ass'n, Statement Before Comm. on Governmental
Operations (Aug. 6, 1979). See also N.Y. County Lawyers Ass'n, Maj. Report on City
Council Bill Interim No. 687 1 (Oct. 29, 1979).
68. See notes 144-146 infra and accompanying text. See generally Durst, Prior
Written Notice for Municipal Liability, 13 TRIAL LAW. Q. 52 (1980).
69. N.Y. STATE CONST. art. IX, § 2(c)(6) (McKinney 1969).
70. N.Y. CT. CL. ACT § 8 (McKinney 1963). For a general discussion of the Court
of Claims Act and prior written notice statutes, see Durst, Prior Written Notice for
Municipal Liability, 13 TRIAL LAW. Q., 52, 64-69 (1980).
71. N.Y. CT. CL. ACT § 8 (McKinney 1963). See note 139 infra.
72. Durst, Prior Written Notice for Municipal Liability, 13 TRIAL LAW. Q. 52, 66
(1980). See also Fullerton v. City of Schenectady, 285 A.D. 545, 551, 138 N.Y.S.2d
916, 922 (Coon, J., dissenting), where it was stated that the prior written notice
statute in Schenectady was inconsistent with the public policy expressed in the Court
of Claims Act.
73. Durst, Prior Written Notice for Municipal Liability, 13 TRIAL LAW. Q. 52, 66
(1980).
74. N.Y. SECOND CLASS CITIES LAW § 244 (McKinney Supp. 1980-81), provides
that no action shall be maintained against a city for injuries obtained as a result of a
defect in a street or sidewalk unless written notice of the defect was actually given to
the commissioner of public works and there was a failure to repair within a reason-
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The Pothole Law was enacted pursuant to section 50-g of the
General Municipal Law 75 which provides that such a statute may be
enacted if the city keeps an indexed record of all written notices of
defects in all streets or sidewalks. 76  The Pothole Law is permissible
under state law because the language of the statute conforms to the
requirements of the General Municipal Law. Even if it is determined
that the General Municipal Law conflicts with the Court of Claims
Act, the General Municipal Law would control. First, the law specifi-
able time either after notice was given or the city had constructive notice of the
defect. Id. N.Y. TOWN LAW § 65-a (McKinney 1965), provides inter alia that no
action shall be maintained against any town unless the town clerk received prior
written notice of the defect and had a reasonable time to repair it, or the town had
constructive notice of the defect. Id. N.Y. VILLAGE LAW § 6-628 (McKinney 1973),
provides that no action shall be maintained against a village unless the village clerk
received prior written notice of the defect and had a reasonable time thereafter to
repair it. Id.
75. N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 50-g (McKinney 1977). Section 50-g provides:
1. Wherever any statute, city charter or local law provides that no civil
action shall be maintained against a city for damages or injuries to person
or property sustained in consequence of any street, highway, bridge,
culvert, sidewalk or crosswalk being out of repair, unsafe, dangerous or
obstructed, or in consequence of the existence of snow or ice thereon,
unless it appear that written notice of the defective, unsafe, dangerous or
obstructed condition, or of the existence of the snow or ice, was actually
given to the city or its specified officer or employee and there was a failure
or neglect within a reasonable time after the giving of such notice to repair
or remove the defect, danger or obstruction complained of, or to cause the
snow or ice to be removed, or the place otherwise made reasonably safe,
the city shall keep an indexed record, in a separate book, of all written
notices which it shall receive of the existence of such defective, unsafe,
dangerous or obstructed condition, or of such snow or ice, which record
shall state the date of receipt of the notice, the nature and location of the
condition stated to exist, and the name of and address of the person from
whom the notice is received.
2. Where the statute, charter or local law requiresthat the written
notice be given to a specified city officer or employee the record shall be
made and kept by the person so specified. Where the statute, charter or
local law requires that the written notice be given to any of several
specified city officers or employees, or omits to specify the officer or
employee to whom the written notice shall be given, the record shall be
made and kept by an officer or employee designated for that purpose by
the governing body of the city. In the absence of such designation the
record shall be made and kept by the commissioner of public works of the
city or, if there be no officer of that title, by an officer exercising corres-
ponding duties. The record of notices of defects shall be a public record.
The record of each notice shall be preserved for a period of five years after
the date it is received.
3. This section shall be applicable notwithstanding any inconsistent
provisions of law, general, special or local, or any limitation contained in
the provisions of any city charter.
76. N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 50-g(2) (McKinney 1977).
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cally states: "[t]his section shall be applicable notwithstanding any
inconsistent provisions of law, general, special or local, or any limita-
tion contained in the provisions of any city charter."' 77 Second, it is a
general rule of statutory construction that "[s]pecific terms prevail
over the general in the same or another statute which otherwise might
be controlling. 7 8  In fact, the New York State Statutes Law specifi-
cally provides that "[w]henever there is a general and a particular
provision in the same statute, the general does not overrule the partic-
ular but applies only where the particular enactment is inapplica-
ble."' 79  Therefore, because the General Municipal Law specifically
enables cities to enact prior written notice statutes, it prevails over the
Court of Claims Act, a general waiver of sovereign immunity. Fur-
thermore, because the city's duty to repair street and sidewalk defects
is a proprietary function, 80 negligence in performing that duty results
in liability.81 Sovereign immunity only applies to governmental func-
tions.8 2 When the state waived its soverign immunity as well as that:
of all its political subdivisions,8 3 the waiver applied only to govern-
mental functions. 84 Section 8 of the Court of Claims Act, therefore,
does not apply to a city's liability with respect to street defects. 85
77. N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 50-g(3) (McKinney 1977).
78. D. Ginsberg and Sons, Inc. v. Popkin, 285 U.S. 204, 208 (1932). See also
Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 489 (1973); Clifford F. MacEvoy Co. v. United
States, 322 U.S. 102, 107 (1944); Baltimore Nat'l Bank v. Tax Comm'n, 297 U.S.
209, 215 (1936); Thielebeule v. M/S Nordsee Pilot, 452 F.2d 1230, 1232 (2d Cir.
1971); People v. Mobil Oil Corp., 48 N.Y.2d 192, 200, 397 N.E.2d 724, 728, 422
N.Y.S.2d 33, 38 (1979); County of Rensselaer v. Capital Dist. Transp. Auth., 42
A.D.2d 445, 447, 349 N.Y.S.2d 20, 23 (3d Dep't 1973).
79. N.Y. STATUTES LAW § 238 (McKinney 1971).
80. See Augustine v. Town of Brant, 249 N.Y. 198, 163 N.E. 732 (1928). See
generally Torts: Liability of Municipality for Injuries Occurring in Public Parks, 28
CORNELL L. Q. 372 (1943); W. PRossm, LAW OF TORTS § 131, at 982 (4th ed. 1971).
81. Rotker v. City of New York, 124 N.Y.S.2d 231 (Mun. Ct. Bronx County 1953).
See notes 9-18 supra.
82. See Whittaker v. Village of Franklinville, 265 N.Y. 11, 191 N.E. 716 (1934).
See generally W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 131, at 979 (4th ed. 1971).
83. Courts have interpreted the state's waiver of sovereign immunity to extend to
its political subdivisions as the latter are merely an extension of the arm of the state.
Bernardine v. City of New York, 294 N.Y. 361, 365, 62 N.E.2d 604, 605 (1945); Cox
v. Village of Greenwich, 33 A.D.2d 264, 266, 306 N.Y.S.2d 987, 990 (3d Dep't
1970); Hay v. Town of Onondaga, 194 Misc. 773, 776, 87 N.Y.S.2d 473, 476 (Sup.
Ct. Onondaga County 1949).
84. See Fullerton v. City of Schenectady, 285 A.D. 545, 547, 138 N.Y.S.2d 916,
918-19 (3d Dep't 1955), aff'd, 309 N.Y. 701, 95 N.E.2d 48 (1955), appeal dismissed,
350 U.S. 980 (1956).
85. 285 A.D. at 548, 138 N.Y.S.2d at 920.
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Several courts in New York State have upheld the constitutionality
of prior written notice statutes. In MacMullen v. City of Middle-
town,86 a city resident sustained injuries incurred in a fall caused by
the accumulation of snow and ice on the sidewalk and brought suit
challenging the validity of the city's prior written notice statute. 87 The
New York Court of Appeals held that the statute was constitutional 88
because a municipal corporation is an agent of the state and exercises
part of the state's sovereign power. 89 In its exercise of this power, the
court held that a municipality may grant, deny or restrict the power
to maintain a private action against it.90
In Hayward v. Schenectady,"' the appellate division declared a
prior written notice law unconstitutional because the court deemed it
inconsistent with the Second Class Cities Law, a general law of the
state.9 The Second Class Cities Law provides that a city is immune
from civil actions arising from street defects unless it receives prior
written notice of the defect or that the defect existed for a period of
time long enough to have been discovered and remedied through the
exercise of reasonable care and diligence. 3 Because the Schenectady
law did not provide for constructive notice, the court determined that
the local law contravened the general state law and was unconstitu-
tional . 94
The Hayward decision was subsequently overruled in Fullerton v.
City of Schenectady, 9 5 where the plaintiff sued the City of Schenec-
tady for injuries sustained when he fell on a defective sidewalk. 96 The
city invoked the prior written notice statute as a defense, asserting
that it had not received notice of the defect prior to the injury. 97 The
86. 187 N.Y. 37, 79 N.E. 863 (1907).
87. Id. at 39, 79 N.E. at 863.
88. Id. at 48, 79 N.E. at 866. The court reasoned that because the municipality
was covered by the state's sovereign power, "it is for the legislature to prescribe
whether, and how far, for the breach of a public duty, the individual may maintain
a civil action to remedy an injury occasioned thereby." Id. at 43, 79 N.E. at 865.
89. Id. at 41, 79 N.E. at 864.
90. Id.
91. 251 A.D. 607, 297 N.Y.S. 736 (3d Dep't 1937) (action against city to recover
for injuries caused by protruding valve in sidewalk where city had not received prior
written notice of defect).
92. Id. at 611, 297 N.Y.S. at 740.
93. N.Y. SECOND CLASS CIrIES LAW § 244 (McKinney Supp. 1980-81). See note 74
supra.
94. 251 A.D. at 611, 297 N.Y.S. at 740.
95. 285 A.D. 545, 138 N.Y.S.2d 916 (3d Dep't 1955), alf'd, 309 N.Y. 701 (1955),
appeal dismissed, 350 U.S. 980 (1956).
96. Id. at 546, 138 N.Y.S.2d at 917.
97. Id. at 546, 138 N.Y.S.2d at 918.
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appellate division held that Schenectady's prior notice law was consti-
tutional . 8 The Fullerton court pointed out that the court in Hay-
ward had overlooked the Second Class Cities Law provision which
states that the law applies "until such provision is superceded pursuant
to the City Home Rule Law. . . ."9 The City Home Rule Law at the
time 00 followed the language of the New York State Constitution,' 0'
which provided that a city shall have the power to adopt and amend
local laws which are not inconsistent with the constitution and laws of
the state relating to the "care, management and use of its streets and
property."' 1 2  The Fullerton court determined that a prior notice
statute related to the care and management of a city's streets 0 3 and
because a city has the power to determine the type of notice it may
require as a condition precedent to liability, 0 4 the Schenectady prior
written notice law was held to be constitutional.10 5
Another argument for declaring the pothole law unconstitutional is
that it violates the equal protection clause of the United States Consti-
tution 106 by arbitrarily dividing all tortfeasors into two classes: private
tortfeasors to whom no prior notice of defect is owed and municipal
tortfeasors to whom prior notice is owed. 0 7 The law similarly divides
98. Id. at 547, 138 N.Y.S.2d at 919.
99. Id. at 546-47, 138 N.Y.S.2d at 918, quoting from N.Y. SECOND CLASS CITIES
LAW § 4 (McKinney 1952) (present version at McKinney Supp. 1980-81). See note 74
supra.
100. The City Home Rule in 1937 stated in relevant part: "the local legislative
body of a city shall have power to adopt and amend local laws in relation to ... the
acquisition, care, management and use of its streets and property .. " Ch. 670, § 1,
1928 N.Y. Laws 1446 (current version at N.Y. MUN. HOME RULE LAW § 11 (McKin-
ney 1969)).
101. N.Y. CONST. art. IX, § 2(c)(6). See note 69 supra and accompanying text.
102. Id.
103. 285 A.D. at 547, 138 N.Y.S.2d at 919.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 548, 138 N.Y.S.2d at 919. New York courts have upheld prior written
notice statutes in other cases. Zidel v. Village of Freeport, 63 A.D.2d 672, 404
N.Y.S.2d 678 (2d Dep't 1978); Drzewiecki v. City of Buffalo, 51 A.D.2d 870 (4th
Dep't 1976); Weingarten v. City of Long Beach, 154 N.Y.S.2d 101 (Long Beach City
Ct. Nassau County 1956). But see Zumbo v. Town of Farmington, 60 A.D.2d 350,
401 N.Y.S.2d 121 (4th Dep't 1978); Klimek v. Town of Ghent, 98 Misc. 2d 893, 414
N.Y.S.2d 662 (Sup. Ct. Columbia County 1979), where local laws were declared
unconstitutional because they were inconsistent with § 50-e of the New York General
Municipal Law.
106. The equal protection clause of the United States Constitution provides, in
relevant part, that no state shall "deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. See note 110 infra.
107. Critics and judges have argued that the Pothole Law also discriminates
against the poor, the uneducated and minorities. N.Y. County Lawyers Ass'n, Maj.
Report on New York City Council Bill Interim No. 687 1 (Oct. 29, 1979). See Hunter
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the claimants into two classes: those who must meet the notice re-
quirements and those who are not subject to them. In cases involving
notice of claim statutes, 08 several state courts' 0 have found that the
creation of such classes does not bear a rational relationship" 0 to the
purposes underlying the statutes."' Therefore, they have been held
to be a violation of the equal protection clause of the federal constitu-
tion." 2
v. North Mason High School, 85 Wash. 2d 810, 813, 539 P.2d 845, 848 (1975) (notice
of claim statutes are discriminatory because only the well educated tort victim will be
able to understand the notice requirements). Furthermore, it is argued by Abraham
Fuchsberg, a negligence attorney, that the streets and sidewalks are in worse condi-
tion in poverty areas so that the poor and minorities are more likely to be affected by
the law than other groups. Fuchsberg, Justice Falls Down These Mean Streets, 13
TRIAL LAW. Q. 45, 49-50 (1980). This determination comes from a study done of
actual cases in Mr. Fuchsberg's office. Id. at 48. The city performed a study which
showed, to the contrary, that less than two percent of the sidewalk and roadway
claims emanate from primary poverty areas. See also Reich v. State Highway Dept.,
386 Mich. 617, 194 N.W.2d 700 (1972); Turner v. Staggs, 89 Nev. 230, 510 P.2d 879
(1973), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1079; Hunter v. North Mason High School, 85 Wash.
2d 810, 539 P.2d 845 (1975).
108. Notice of claim statutes generally provide that as a condition precedent to
bringing an action against a municipality, a claimant must file notice of his claim
with the city within a designated amount of time after the claim arises. See, e.g.,
MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 691.1404 (Supp. 1981); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 244.245-250
(1979).
109. See note 111 infra. The New York notice of claim statute, N.Y. GEN. MUN.
LAW § 50-e (McKinney 1977), has been upheld by the appellate division as not
violative of the equal protection clause of the state and federal Constitutions. Guar-
rera v. A.L. Lee Memorial Hosp., 51 A.D.2d 867, 867, 380 N.Y.S.2d 161, 162 (4th
Dep't 1976). See also Pausley v. Chaloner, 54 A.D.2d 131, 133, 388 N.Y.S.2d 35, 37
(3d Dep't 1976).
110. The rational basis test was set forth in Lindsley v. National Carbonic Gas
Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78 (1911). The Court held that a state does not violate the equal
protection clause if the classification made by the law has a reasonable basis. Id. The
rational basis test evolved because the Court recognized that states must often classify
their citizens in order to function properly. Id. A classification is not violative of the
Constitution because "it is not made with mathematical nicety or because in practice
it results in some inequality." Id. In City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297
(1976), the state's interest in maintaining the city's appearance in its French Quarter
constituted a rational basis for sustaining a regulation banning certain street vendors.
Id. at 304-05. In Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974), the Supreme
Court sustained a regulation restricting land use to one family dwellings because the
state's interest in preserving residential neighborhoods was rational. Id. at 7-8. See
Carmichael v. Southern Coal Co., 301 U.S. 495, 509-10 (1937); Developments in the
Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1065, 1077-81 (1969); Notice of Claim
Provisions: An Equal Protection Perspective, 60 CORNELL L. REV. 417, 436-37 (1975).
See generally Note, Inmate Abortions- The Right to Government Funding Behind
the Prison Gates, 48 FORDHAM L. REV. 550, 565-66 (1980).
111. Reich v. State Highway Dep't, 386 Mich. 617, 623, 194 N.W.2d 700, 702
(1972); Turner v. Staggs, 89 Nev. 230, 510 P.2d 879 (1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S.
1079 (1973); Hunter v. North Mason High School, 85 Wash. 2d 810, 539 P.2d 845
(1975).
112: Id. See notes 116, 120 infra.
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For example, in Turner v. Staggs,113 an action was brought on
behalf of minor children against the administrator of a county hospi-
tal for the wrongful death of their mother.114 The claim was not filed
until thirteen months after the mother's death." 5 The Nevada notice
of claim statute required that a claim against a county had to be filed
within six months from the date the cause of action arose. 116  The
Nevada Supreme Court held that the statute violated the equal pro-
tection clause of both the Nevada and the United States constitutions
because "failure to give the 6 month statutory notice arbitrarily bars
the victims of governmental tort while the victims of private tort
suffer no such bar." 117
As the Washington Supreme Court pointed out in Hunter v. North
Mason High School,"" the major consideration in enacting a notice of
claim statute is to protect the government from liability for its own
wrongdoing."" By waiving the sovereign immunity of the state and
its political subdivisions, 120 the government places itself in a position
equal to that of private persons and corporations.' 21 Therefore, the
court reasoned that the state and its subdivisions forfeited the right to
a special status separate from that of individuals.122 In addition, the
court held that protection of the public treasury is not a valid purpose
on which to uphold notice of claim statutes. 123 Consequently, there
was no justification for discriminating between victims of governmen-
tal torts and victims of private torts. 124
113. 89 Nev. 230, 510 P.2d 879 (1973).
114. Id. at 231, 510 P.2d at 880.
115. Id.
116. NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 244.245, 244.250 (1979).
117. 89 Nev. at 235, 510 P.2d at 883.
118. 85 Wash. 2d 810, 539 P.2d 845 (1975) (action brought against school district
for injury sustained by student during gym class failed to comply with 120 day
statutory notice of claim requirement).
119. Id. at 818-19, 539 P.2d at 850.
120. 1963 Wash. Laws ch. 159, § 2. In New York State the waiver of sovereign
immunity is not at issue because street repair is a proprietary function. See notes
80-82 supra.
121. 85 Wash. 2d at 818, 539 P.2d at 850. "Our state has clearly and unequivo-
cally abjured any desire to so insulate itself from liability, however, in its absolute
waiver of sovereign immunity, which places the government on an equal footing
with private parties defendant." Id. See note 111 supra.
122. Id.
123. Id. See notes 125-128 infra and accompanying text.
124. Id. Note, Notice of Claim Provisions: An Equal Protection Perspective, 60
CORNELL L. REV. 417, 440-45 (1975). The author argues that notice of claim statutes
should be struck down as irrational because they fall short of meeting their goals.
Alternatively, if the statute achieves those ends, it does so at too great a cost to
victims of governmental torts. Id. at 440-41. This analysis involves a determination
of whether less drastic means of achieving those same goals are available. Id. at 442.
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Other courts, in striking down the doctrine of sovereign immunity,
have held that a city's financial problems do not justify shielding it
from liability. 12 5 Payment of damage claims by a city for its negli-
gence is not a proper purpose.126 In addition, the issue of the munici-
pality's ability to pay such damages is not relevant to a determination
of whether the law is fair and equitable.127 "Anything short of finan-
cial disaster, . . . is insufficient reason for exempting the cities from
the rule of tort liability.' ' 28
Prior written notice of defect statutes, like notice of claim statutes,
involve complex notice requirements and are enacted to save money
by shielding the municipality from liability for its own negligence.
Therefore, the same equal protection argument can be applied to
strike down the Pothole Law, unless a court finds that it is a rational
means of achieving those goals.
The New York notice of claim statute has been upheld by the
judiciary. The appellate division in Pausley v. Chaloner, 129 upheld the
statute on the basis of the state's sovereign immunity. 30  Pausley
involved a minor child's suit against a county hospital for negligent
treatment. The court stated that the operation of a hospital is a
governmental function. 31  Formerly, a municipal corporation was
insulated from liability for negligent performance of government
functions pursuant to the doctrine of sovereign immunity. In limiting
liability the court reasoned that although the legislature had waived
the state's sovereign immunity, it nevertheless retained the power to
125. Parish v. Pitts, 244 Ark. 1239, 1252, 429 S.W.2d 45, 51 (1968) (in an action
for injuries sustained as a result of city employee's negligence, the rule shielding a
municipality from liability for negligent acts of its employees was patently unjust and
was overturned); Ayala v. Philadelphia Bd. of Pub. Educ., 453 Pa. 584, 596, 305
A.2d 877, 883 (the court abolished the doctrine of sovereign immunity in an action
against Board of Education for injuries sustained by student). See also Leflar and
Kantrowitz, Tort Liability of the States, 29 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1363 (1954); Note, The
Discretionary Exception and Municipal Tort Liability: A Reappraisal, 52 MINN. L.
REv. 1047 (1968).
126. 453 Pa. at 596, 305 A.2d at 883.
127. Id. at 597, 305 A.2d at 883, quoting from Flagiello v. Pennsylvania Hosp.,
417 Pa. 486, 503-04, 208 A.2d 193, 202 (1965).
128. 244 Ark. at 1249, 429 S.W.2d at 50. Cf. Muskopf v. Corning Hosp. Dist., 55
Cal. 2d 211, 216, 359 P.2d 457, 460, 11 Cal. Rptr. 89, 92 (1961) (the doctrine of
governmental immunity is "without rational basis").
129. 54 A.D.2d 131, 388 N.Y.S.2d 35 (3d Dep't 1976), appeal dismissed, 41
N.Y.2d 900 (1977). See also Note, Notice of Claim Provisions: An Equal Protection
Perspective, 60 CORNELL L. REV. 417, 431 (1975) (constitutionality of notice of claim
provisions discussed on due process and equal protection grounds).
130. 54 A.D.2d at 133, 388 N.Y.S.2d at 37.
131. Id. See notes 9-16 supra and accompanying text.
1982]
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL
condition the right to bring suit. 132 This holding cannot be applied to
the Pothole Law, however, because the city's duty to repair defects in
streets and sidewalks always has been considered a proprietary func-
tion. '33
The New York notice of claim statute is considered valid because
the classifications it creates have a rational basis.' 34  The appellate
division has observed that the purpose of the statute was "to assure the
city an adequate opportunity to investigate the circumstances sur-
rounding the accident and to explore the merits of the claim while
information is still readily available."' 35 This purpose was deemed to
be valid and was held to provide a rational basis for the difference in
treatment accorded municipal and private negligence victims. 36 The
New York City prior written notice statute, however, does not have a
valid purpose. Rather, its purpose mirrors that of the notice of claim
statutes held unconstitutional in other states- to insulate New York
City from liability and thereby reduce the amount of money paid out
in sidewalk and roadway claims. Therefore, the discrimination be-
tween victims of municipal negligence and private negligence engen-
dered by the Pothole Law has no rational basis. '37
132. 54 A.D.2d at 133, 388 N.Y.S.2d at 37, citing Matter of Brown v. Board of
Trustees, 303 N.Y. 484, 489, 104 N.E.2d 866, 868-69 (1952).
133. See note 80 supra and accompanying text.
134. Guarerra v. A.L. Lee Memorial Hosp., 51 A.D.2d 867, 867, 380 N.Y.S.2d
161, 162 (4th Dep't 1976) (plaintiff, in malpractice action against municipal hospital,
failed to meet the notice of claim requirements of the New York General Municipal
Law § 50-e).
135. Id. at 867, 380 N.Y.S.2d at 162, quoting Teresta v. City of New York, 304
N.Y. 440, 443, 108 N.E.2d 397, 398 (1952).
136. Id. In Zipser v. Pound, 69 Misc. 2d 152, 329 N.Y.S.2d 494 (White Plains City
Ct.), rev'd, 79 Misc. 2d 489, 348 N.Y.S.2d 18 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County 1972),
the trial court held that the New York notice of claim statute violated the due process
and equal protection provisions of the United States Constitution because the statute
created two classes of plaintiffs. The appellate cdurt, however, reversed the lower
court's holding that discrimination between plaintiffs on the basis of the tortfeasor's
identity violated the Constitution's guarantee of equal protection of the laws.
137. Another constitutional argument advanced is that the Pothole Law violates
the due process clause of the New York State Constitution. N.Y. County Lawyers
Ass'n, Maj. Report on City Council Bill Interim No. 687 3 (Oct. 29, 1979). This
argument was used in other jurisdictions where prior notice laws were declared void.
In City of Tulsa v. Wells, 79 Okl. 39, 191 P. 186 (1920), plaintiff was injured when
thrown from his bicycle after contact with uneven pavement and subsequently
brought an action against the city for failure to maintain the pavement in a reasona-
bly safe condition. Id. at 40, 191 P. at 187. The City of Tulsa argued that plaintiff
failed to meet the prior written notice requirement set forth in the city charter. Id. at
47, 191 P. at 194. The Oklahoma Supreme Court, however, declared the prior
written notice requirement unconstitutional because it placed a nearly impossible
burden upon a litigant by requiring that he inform the mayor that he expected to be
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The Pothole Law has been criticized as a procedural device to
re-enact the doctrine of sovereign immunity. 138 The New York State
legislature, recognizing the unfairness of the doctrine, waived the
sovereign immunity of the state and its political subdivisions when the
Court of Claims Act was passed. 139 In fact, courts throughout the
United States reject the doctrine 40 because it places too great a bur-
den on tort victims who are left without a remedy while the financial
burden easily can be "spread by taxes among the public receiving the
injured or that someone else inform the mayor of the defect at least twenty-four hours
before the accident. Id. at 48-49, 191 P. at 195. Such a requirement "so far depart[s]
from reasonableness as to amount to a denial of justice, and is therefore void." Id. at
49, 191 P. at 196. Prior written notice "provision of the charter, upon its face, is
unreasonable, and ...to hold it good would be to couple a remedy with a fre-
quently impossible condition." Id., quoting Born v. City of Spokane, 27 Wash. 719,
__ 68 P. 386, 89 (1902). Hanks v. City of Port Arthur, 121 Tex. 202, -, 48
S.W.2d 944, 947 (1932) (the requirement of notice was determined to be an "unrea-
sonable abridgement of the right to obtain redress for injuries, and [therefore]
amounted to a denial of due process.").
Wells, Born and Hanks based their holdings on state constitutional provisions
which granted every citizen the right to a remedy for an injury sustained. See e.g.,
TEXAs CONST. art. I, § 13 (1955). Because such a provision does not exist in the New
York State Constitution, restricting a person's right to recover by creating procedural
requirements as a condition precedent to recovery does not violate the state constitu-
tion. The due process arguments against the Pothole Law are invalid.
138. See note 67 supra.
139. N.Y. CT. CL. ACT § 8 (McKinney 1963) provides:
The state hereby waives its immunity from liability and action and hereby
assumes liability and consents to have the same determined in accordance
with the same rules of law as applied to actions in the supreme court
against individuals or corporations, provided the claimant complies with
the limitations of this article ...
Id. See note 71 supra. The state waived its sovereign immunity generally because of
"the widespread dissatisfaction and injustice of turning out of court, remediless,,
citizens who had been injured by negligence on the part of agents of the state."
Williams v. City of New York, 57 N.Y.S.2d 39, 40 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1945)
(action brought against firemen for negligent maintenance of firehouse). Another
purpose of the Court of Claims Act was "to obviate the need for frequent special
legislative acts to redress wrongs and to make whole those damaged by the State
through Court machinery established for that purpose by the Legislature." Corcoran
v. New York, 56 Misc. 2d 293, 298, 288 N.Y.S.2d 801, 806 (Ct. Cl.), rev'd on other
grounds, 30 A.D.2d 991, 294 N.Y.S.2d 171 (3d Dep't 1968), af'd, 24 N.Y.2d 922,
249 N.E.2d 764, 301 N.Y.S.2d 985 (1969).
140. City of Phoenix v. Williams, 89 Ariz. 299, 361 P.2d 651 (1961); Parish v.
Pitts, 244 Ark. 1239, 429 S.W.2d 45 (1968); Woods v. City of Palatka, 63 So. 2d 636
(Fla. 1953); Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit Dist. No. 302, 18 Ill. 2d 11, 163
N.E.2d 89 (1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 968 (1960); Haney v. City of Lexington, 386
S.W.2d 738 (Ct. App. Kentucky 1964); Happy v. Erwin, 330 S.W.2d 412 (Ct. App.
Kentucky 1959); Hicks v. State, 88 N.M. 588, 544 P.2d 1153 (1975); Ayala v.
Philadelphia Bd. of Public Educ., 453 Pa. 584, 305 A.2d 877 (1973); Lebohm v. City
of Galveston, 154 Tex. 192, 275 S.W.2d 951 (1955).
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benefits."' 4 1 The Pothole Law in its attempt to limit liability by
creating harsh procedural requirements, effectively shields the city
from liability and revives the doctrine of sovereign immunity. The
court in Fullerton v. City of Schenectady,142 while holding that a
prior written notice statute was valid, noted that the statute's purpose
undermined the waiver of sovereign immunity.143
A third legal argument against the Pothole Law is that it abrogates
the traditional concepts of common law negligence that govern mu-
nicipal liability. For instance, common law held the city liable for
injuries caused by dangerous conditions in the streets and sidewalks if
it had actual or constructive notice. 144 If the injured party knew of
the defect, the doctrine of comparative negligence reduced recovery
in proportion to the extent that the victim's negligence contributed to
the injury. 4 5 The Pothole Law, however, eliminates the doctrine of
constructive notice and may bar recovery even if an injured party had
no knowledge of the defect.
Pursuant to the Pothole Law, New York City is liable only for
injuries caused by defects of which it had actual prior written notice.
This removes the city's incentive to inspect and maintain the streets in
reasonably safe condition for the public. For example, if the city knew
about a particular pothole because it was located immediately in front
of City Hall and had been there for several years, liability still could
not be incurred if written notice had not been submitted prior to an
injury.
141. Parish v. Pitts, 244 Ark. at 1247, 429 S.W.2d at 49.
142. 285 A.D. 545, 138 N.Y.S.2d 916 (3d Dep't 1955), afJ'd, 309 N.Y. 701, 95
N.E.2d 48 (1955) appeal dismissed, 350 U.S. 980 (1956).
143. 285 A.D. at 548, 138 N.Y.S.2d at 919-20. The court stated it readily agreed
"that local laws of the character involved here are in reality attempts to bar tort
actions under the guise of a procedural requirement, and that they put upon many
deserving litigants an impossible burden." Id.
144. See note 7 supra.
145. N.Y. Civ. PRnc. § 1411 (McKinney 1976). The statute provides:
In any action to recover damages for personal injury, injury to property,
or wrongful death, the culpable conduct attributable to the claimant or to
the decedent, including contributory negligence or assumption of risk,
shall not bar recovery, but the amount of damages otherwise recoverable
shall be diminished in the proportion which the culpable conduct attribut-
able to the claimant or decedent bears to the culpable conduct which
caused the damages.
Id. See also Copart Indus., Inc. v. Consolidated Edison Co., 41 N.Y.2d 564, 362
N.E.2d 968, 394 N.Y.S.2d 169 (1977); Long v. Zientowski, 73 Misc. 2d 719, 340
N.Y.S.2d 652 (Dunkirk City Ct. Chautauqua County 1973); Homburger, The 1975
New York Judicial Conference Package: Class Actions and Comparative Negligence,
25 BUFFALO L. REV. 415, 430-38 (1975); Krause, Comparative Negligence in New
York, 47 N.Y.S.B.A.J. 638 (1975).
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The Pothole Law places an affirmative obligation to report defects
on the public because in the absence of such a report, recovery is
denied. Thus, even though an individual reports one pothole, that
person may still be barred from recovering for injuries caused by
another street defect. Recovery would be denied because other citi-
zens failed to report the second defect. The common law concept of
comparative negligence, consequently, is turned upside down and the
victim is penalized due to the city's lack of prior knowledge of the
defect. Furthermore, the city's liability is no longer predicated upon
whether an individual has complied with the procedural steps im-
posed by the statute.
The debate surrounding the enactment of the Pothole Law involves
important policy considerations. Opponents of the law, including
special interest groups such as the New York State Trial Lawyers
Association, the Automobile Club of New York, negligence lawyers,
and citizens contend that the legislature's reasons 14 for enactment do
not justify the procedural inequities it creates. The Pothole Law
places an undue burden on the individual tort victim by requiring
compliance with complex notice requirements.147 In addition, injured
victims suffer financial hardship if they are denied recovery because
prior written notice had not been submitted, while the burden of
paying for such damages could be borne more easily by an entire
community.148  Since the city performs activities capable of causing
146. As stated in Section Three of this Note, the city had four major reasons for
enacting the prior written notice statute: to achieve conformity with other cities in
New York State; to reduce the amount of money paid out in sidewalk and roadway
claims; to eliminate fraudulent claims; and to encourage the city to make repairs. See
notes 38-41 supra and accompanying text.
147. Even those persons who are literate and civic minded enough to comply with
the requirements of the statute cannot be expected to write letters every time they
discover defects in the city's sidewalks and streets. N.Y. Times, Nov. 15, 1979, § 1, at
30, col. 5 (letter to the editor by Abraham Fuchsberg). Mr. Fuchsberg asked whether
the "less fortunate, less literate, less able to speak or write, our aged and our blind
. . ." can be expected to write such letters? Id. Furthermore, it is precisely these less
fortunate, such as senior citizens, who are most often the victims of defective side-
walk injuries. Fuchsberg, Justice Falls Down These Mean Streets, 13 TRIAL LAW. Q.
45, 48 (1980). See also City of Tulsa v. Wells, 79 Okla. 39, 48-49, 191 P. 186, 195
(1920); Hanks v. City of Port Arthur, 121 Tex. 202, 48 S.W.2d 944, 947 (Tex. 1932).
N.Y. County Lawyers Ass'n, Maj. Report on City Council Bill Interim No. 687 1
(Oct. 29, 1979). The report states that many people cannot fill out forms or speak
English, no less write a cogent letter describing a defect. Id. Cf. 85 Wash. 2d at 814,
539 P.2d at 848. For a detailed description of the notice procedures involved, see
notes 56-57 supra and accompanying text.
148. See Parish v. Pitts, 244 Ark. 1239, 1247, 429 S.W.2d 45, 49 (1968); Barker v.
City of Santa Fe, 47 N.M. 85, 85, 136 P.2d 480, 482 (1943); Ayala v. Philadelphia
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injuries, the injuries those activities cause should be viewed as "part of
the normal and proper costs of public administration and not as a
diversion of public funds."' 149 Otherwise, the injured victim of the
city's negligence has no legal remedy. Finally, the Pothole Law invites
litigation because some of its provisions are vague. Nowhere in the
statute is proper notice defined; instead this issue is left to the courts
for interpretation. 150  The city has argued that the statute would
eliminate fraudulent claims. Such claims do not disappear with the
enactment of a prior written notice statute, however, because it is a
simple matter to create a defect, report it, and then arrange for an
accident to occur.151 Furthermore, reduction of fraudulent claims is
not a policy reason which justifies the enactment of a statute. 152
Few, if any, cities in the United States outside New York State have
prior written notice of defect statutes. 153 There are three types of
statutes in other states, however, which establish a city's duty to
maintain streets and which impose liability with respect to claims
arising out of failure to repair defective streets. First, some statutes
impose an affirmative duty on a municipality to keep its streets and
sidewalks in reasonably safe condition and free from nuisances.
54
Bd. of Public Educ., 453 Pa. 584, 593, 305 A.2d 877, 881, quoting Barker v. City of
Santa Fe, 47 N.M. 85, 85, 136 P.2d 480, 482.
149. Ayala v. Philadelphia Bd. of Public Educ., 453 Pa. 584, 594, 305 A.2d 877,
882, quoting Comments on Recent Important Tort Cases, 32 AM. TRIAL LAW. J. 284,
288 (1968).
150. N.Y. County Lawyers Ass'n, Maj. Report on City Council Bill Interim No.
687 3 (Oct. 29, 1979). See notes 55-64 supra and accompanying text.
151. N.Y. County Lawyers Ass'n, Maj. Report on City Council Bill Interim No.
687 3 (Oct. 29, 1979).
152. The Report stated that elimination of fraudulent claims would not be "an
acceptable tradeoff for the equally expected denial of many legitimate claims which
would be prevented." Id. at 3. The New York State Court of Appeals also has
addressed this issue.
Although fraud, extra litigation and a measure of speculation are, of
course, possibilities, it is no reason for a court to eschew a measure of its
jurisdiction. "The argument from mere expediency cannot commend itself
to a Court of justice, resulting in the denial of a logical legal right and
remedy in all cases because in some fictitious injury may be urged as a real
one.
Battalla v. State, 10 N.Y.2d 237, 240-41, 219 N.Y.S.2d 34, 37 (1961), quoting Green
v. T.A. Shoemaker & Co., 111 Md. 69, 81, 73 A. 688, 692 (1909) (emphasis added by
N.Y. Court of Appeals).
153. See, e.g., Pomeroy v. City of Independence, 209 Or. 587, 307 P.2d 760
(1957) (city charter provision that immunized city from liability in absence of prior
written notice of defect causing injury held valid).
154. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 50-313 (1980); IOWA CODE ANN. § 364.12 (West 1976);
MICH. COMP. LAWS § 102.1 (1967); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 723.01 (Page 1976).
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For example, an Ohio statute establishes a municipality's powers and
duties with respect to street maintenance. The statute provides that a
municipal corporation "shall have the care, supervision, and control
of public highways, streets, . . . sidewalks, . . . and viaducts within
the municipal corporation, and shall cause them to be kept open, in
repair, and free from nuisance."' 155 Second, a city's liability may be
determined according to whether it received actual or constructive
notice of a defect. 56 In Georgia, for instance, a municipality is
insulated from liability resulting from defects in public streets "when
it has not been negligent in constructing or maintaining the same or
when it has no actual notice thereof, or when such defect has not
existed for a sufficient length of time for notice thereof to be in-
ferred." 157 Third, some states limit a city's liability to cases where
only actual notice of the defect was received prior to the injury. 158 In
Maine, for example, the state statute provides that in order for a
municipality to be liable for injuries due to street defects, the munici-
pal officers must have "had 24 hours actual notice of the defect or
want of repair ... ...19 Until recently, Nebraska was the only state
which had a prior written notice of defect statute. 160 In 1970, how-
ever, the statute was repealed and the common law doctrine of actual
or constructive notice was reinstated. 16 '
Thus, while some states hold a municipality liable for failure to
maintain its streets in reasonably safe repair when the city has actual
155. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 723.01 (Page 1976). See, e.g., Cleveland v. Amato,
123 Ohio St. 575, 176 N.E. 227 (1931).
156. GA. CODE § 95A-505 (1976); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 691.1403 (West 1968);
1959 MINN. LAWS ch. 663.
157. GA. CODE § 95A-505 (1976). City of Atlanta v. Williams, 119 Ga. App. 353,
166 S.E.2d 896 (1969).
158. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 3655 (Supp. 1981-82).
159. Id. In some states, actual notice does not have to be in writing. In Montana,
for example, a telephone call to an unidentified employee of a city official was held
to constitute actual notice. Ratliff v. City of Great Falls, 132 Mont. 89, -, 314
P.2d 880, 883 (1957) (action against municipality for injuries sustained from fall on
defective sidewalk; city deemed to have actual notice of defect). The Montana notice
of defect statute, MONT. REV. CODE ANN. § 11-1305 (1968), has since been repealed.
1977 Mont. Laws ch. 234, § 9.
160. NEBRASKA REV. STAT. § 14-802 (1977). See also Durst, Prior Written Notice
for Municipal Liability, 13 TRIAL LAW. Q. 52, 56 (1980).
161. 1969 Neb. Laws ch. 138, § 28. See also Mackey v. Midwest Supply Co., 186
Neb. 834, 186 N.W.2d 916 (1971). It appears that the statute may have been
repealed in order to facilitate an individual's ability to successfully bring suit. The
repealing statute states:
The Legislature . . .declares that it is its intent and purpose through this
enactment to provide uniform procedures for the bringing of tort claims
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or constructive notice of a particular defect or dangerous condition,
other states opt for the more stringent requirement of actual notice.
There are no states other than New York, however, which require
written notice of the defect before the injury occurs.
IV. Conclusion
The City of New York enacted its prior written notice statute as a
procedural device to save money. 8 2 Although the budgetary prob-
lems the city experienced necessitated a change in common law princi-
ples of municipal liability, 16 3 it is questionable whether the statute
limits liability in the most effective or equitable manner. The Pothole
Law should be revised so that liability is imposed when the city has
received actual or constructive notice. Constructive notice should be
presumed after a specific period of time has elapsed. This was the
approach taken by the Michigan legislature with respect to the repair
of highways.
No governmental agency is liable for injuries or damages caused by
defective highways unless the governmental agency knew, or in the
exercise of reasonable diligence should have known, of the existence
of the defect and had a reasonable time to repair the defect before
the injury took place. Knowledge of the defect and time to repair
the same shall be conclusively presumed when the defect existed so
as to be readily apparent to an ordinarily observant person for a
period of 30 days or longer before the injury took place, 1 4
A law patterned after the Michigan model would give the city ample
time before it is deemed to have notice and sufficient time in which to
repair the defect. It also would provide an incentive to inspect the
streets for defects and make repairs because failure to do so would
result in liability. Finally, it would enable an injured person with a
valid claim to recover damages in almost all cases when the city is
negligent. 16 5
against all political subdivisions, whether engaging in governmental or
proprietary functions, and that the procedures provided by this act shall
be used to the exclusion of all others.
1969 Neb. Laws ch. 138, § 1.
162. See note 34 supra.
163. See notes 153-161 supra and accompanying text.
164. Micu. COMp. LAWS § 691.1403 (1968). See, e.g., Sable v. City of Detroit, 1
Mich. App. 87, -, 134 N.W.2d 375 (1965).
165. Rather than specifying 30 days for the presumption of notice to arise and
time to effect repairs, it might be more equitable to allow the presumption to arise
after a reasonable time has passed, taking into account the nature and location of a
defect. For example, the city should be given less time to repair a five inch hole in a
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In addition to statutory measures, it is necessary to set up an effi-
cient system of reporting defects. A satisfactory system of reporting
defects would provide an adequate amount of time to make repairs
and not impose complex procedures with which the average citizen
cannot comply. Citizens do not have the resources or the organization
to submit reports' 6 nor is the city's current system of five inspectors
per borough adequate. 1 7  If the duty to inspect the streets were
shifted to employees of the Department of Sanitation, for instance,
the city would be able to improve reporting efficiency without unrea-
sonable increases in cost. 1
68
The combination of a new statute and a new system of reporting
defects would accomplish the city's purposes of reducing claims and
improving efficiency in undertaking repairs, and do so in a manner
which does not violate the common law right of tort victims to recover
for injuries sustained as a result of another's wrong.
Terri J. Frank
major intersection than to repair the erosion of two lanes of a major highway.
Similarly, constructive notice should be imputed to the city after a long period of
time in the case of a small defect in a relatively untravelled area, whereas only fifteen
days might be enough time to impute notice to the city for a two foot hole in front of
City Hall. See generally Town of Monticello v. Kenard, 7 Ind. App. 135, 34 N.E. 454
(1893) (eight foot wide obstruction gave rise to notice in a three day period); City of
Dayton v. Thompson, 372 S.W.2d 407 (Ky. Ct. App. 1963) (a hole 3 feet deep gave
rise to notice after several days); Dahl v. Nelson, 79 N.D. 400, 56 N.W.2d 757 (1953)
(one day was not enough time to give rise to constructive notice of ruts around
manhole cover).
166. See note 25 supra.
167. Sidewalk and Roadway Analysis, supra note 2, at 14.
168. The sanitation crews which cover the city's streets several times a week could,
with a minimum of additional money, men, or time, keep a record of the defects and
submit it at the end of each day. The city would then file these records in a manner
similar to the system presently utilized and undertake repairs accordingly. It is likely
that unions representing the sanitation workers would balk at such an additional
responsibility without an increase in pay. Hence, this is an additional subject for the
city and the unions to discuss in negotiations. Despite the immediate increased costs
to the city, such a program would save money in the long-run because the amount
paid out in claims would substantially decrease.

